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The ECJ’s ruling further develops the concept of a
«single economic unit» that allows attribution of
liability for anti-competitive conduct in cases in-
volving complex corporate structures where the
possibility of exercising a decisive influence cannot
be always determined on the basis of the control-
ling shareholdings. The existence of a «single eco-
nomic unit» can be inferred on the basis of a «con-
sistent body of evidence» requiring case-by-case
assessment.
(1) Facts and Procedure
(a) Background to the Appeal
The litigation in question originates from the
Commission’s Plasterboard decision1
against BPB PLC, Gebrüder Knauf Westdeutsche
Gipswerke KG (now Knauf Gips), Société Lafarge
SA and Gyproc Benelux NV.2 The Commission con-
cluded that the undertakings had infringed Art-
icle 81(1) EC (now Article 101(1) TFEU) by partici-
pating in a series of agreements and concerted
practices aimed at stabilising prices on the plaster-
board markets in several Member States. When
setting the basic amount of the fine the Commis-
sion considered that (1) the infringement was very
serious by its nature insofar as it pursued the end
of the price war; (2) it had a significant impact on
the already highly-concentrated and oligopolistic
market; and (3) it had covered major EU markets
such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom
and the Benelux. For Knauf Gips the starting
amount of the fine was set at EUR 52 million,
which was then increased by 65% for the long du-
ration of the infringement (from 31 March
1992,to 25 November 1998), which brought the
final amount of the fine imposed on Knauf Gips to
EUR 85,8 million.
The Commission considered the peculiar struc-
ture of the Knauf Group noting that Mr. B
and Mr. C, Knauf Gips high level representatives
were also the managers of Gebrüder Knauf Ver-
waltungsgesellschaft KG (Knauf VG), a holding
company, the function of which was to adminis-
ter other companies of the Knauf Group.3 While
the Commission’s infringement decision was ad-
dressed to Knauf Gips, the turnover taken into ac-
count for calculating the fine accounted for the
worldwide turnover of all of the Knauf Group’s
companies involved in the manufacturing of plas-
terboard.4
Knauf Gips challenged the Commission’s decision
before the General Court (GC). The appellant’s
claim concerned inter alia the alleged infringe-
ment of the appellant’s rights of defence, the con-
cept of single infringement the principle of equal
treatment when determining the amount of the
fine and procedural irregularities contrary to the
principle of good administration.5 The appeal
was dismissed by the GC.6
(b) Arguments of the Parties before the ECJ
The appellant contested the GC’s finding that
Knauf Gips formed a single economic unit with
other companies within the Knauf Group and that
it was responsible for the actions of the Knauf
Group. Knauf Gips argued that its case differed
from the factual situation in Stora,7 the ECJ’s judg-
ment which set a rebuttable presumption that a
100% shareholding indicates that a parent com-
pany is able to exercise a decisive influence over
the conduct of a subsidiary. Knauf Gips argued
that the Stora presumption was not applicable be-
cause in the present case the appellant was not
controlled by another company, and it did not
hold shares in the companies related to Knauf VG.
Referring to the Baustahlgewebe case8 where the
GC found that there was no economic unit in
case of several minority shareholders, the
appellant excluded the possibility of finding joint
control by the existence of many shareholders be-
longing to Knauf family. Knauf Gips also relied on
Aristrain where the ECJ found that the simple fact
that the share capital of two separate companies
is held by the same person or the same family is in-
sufficient, in itself, to establish the existence of an
economic unit.9 According to the applicant, the
fact that Mr. B and Mr. C represented both Knauf
Gips and Knauf VG could not imply that the com-
panies were acting as a single economic unit for
the purposes of the EU competition law, contrary
to the GC’s judgment.10 Thus, by emphasising the
corporate/structural arguments in determining
the existence of an economic unit, Knauf Gips
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seemed to downplay the behavioural elements,
arguing that the fact that the same two share-
holders managed all the companies in the Knauf
Group and represented them during the period
when the infringement was observed should be ir-
relevant.11
According to the Commission, the GC based its
finding of an economic unit on a number of fac-
tors including inter alia that during the Commis-
sion’s investigation, Mr. B and Mr. C represented
the whole Knauf Group being the sole interlocu-
tors with the Commission and providing the latter
with the sales data of all companies in the Knauf
Group active on the plasterboard market. The
Commission drew a parallel with Stora showing
that the Knauf Group was managed under
a family contract, which ensured that the
whole group fell under single management.12 The
Commission saw no contradiction with the Aris-
train judgment because Mr. B and Mr. C were
managing shareholders who ensured the single
management of the whole group.13
(c) Opinion of the Advocate General
When evaluating the appellant’s submission in the
light of the GC’s reasoning, Advocate General
Mazak noted that (1) «the assessment of whether
a group of companies constitutes an economic
unit is not a matter of legal form but requires a
case-by-case analysis, close attention being
paid to the specific facts of each individual case»;14
and (2) the GC did not base its finding of an eco-
nomic unit in the present case on the basis of iso-
lated facts derived from the preceding jurispru-
dence.
By way of illustration, the AG noted that in Bau-
stahlgewebe the GC did not base its finding of the
absence of control solely on the numerical per-
centage shareholding, so the existence of 22
shareholders within Knauf Group and the possibil-
ity of fluctuating majorities could not, per se, pre-
clude the GC from finding the existence of the
economic unit.15 According to AG Mazak the GC’s
finding was also in accordance with the Aristrain
judgment where the ECJ held that the simple fact
that the share capital of two separate commercial
companies is held by the same person or the same
family is insufficient in itself to establish that those
companies formed an economic unit.16 The fact
that the appellant volunteered, without being re-
quested, to provide the Commission with data not
only in relation to its turnover, but also the
turnover of all the companies with the Knauf
Group was additional evidence for the GC to find
that those companies constituted an economic
unit with common interests.17 The GC also noted
that Knauf VG was only a holding company,
which was managed by the same individu-
als as the appellant, on the same premises
and with the same personnel.18 At the same
time, among the objectives of the Knauf family
contract, the GC highlighted that Article 1 of
that contract sought to ensure that the companies
within the Knauf Group were organised through a
single management structure with a common
purpose.19
According to AG Mazak, the appellant failed to
demonstrate an error in law on the part of the GC
in finding that the companies belonging to the
Knauf family constitute a single economic unit.20
In his opinion, AG Mazak did not address in much
detail whether the GC has correctly found that in
this particular case the appellant was not acting
independently of other companies within the
Knauf Group. The AG simply stated that it is set-
tled case-law that the anti-competitive conduct of
an undertaking can be attributed to another un-
dertaking where it has not decided independently
upon its own conduct on the market, but carried
out the instructions given to it by that other un-
dertaking, having regard in particular to the eco-
nomic and legal links between them.21
At the same time AG Mazak disagreed with the
GC’s statement that Knauf Gips should have been
aware from the Commission’s Statement of
Objections (SO) that the infringement con-
cerned the whole Knauf Group. Referring to Akzo
Nobel, the GC stated that «in such as situation,
the onus was on the appellant to react during the
administrative procedure, or be faced with the
prospect of no longer being able to do so, by
demonstrating that, despite the factors relied on
by the Commission, it could not be held liable for
the infringement committed by the Knauf
Group».22 AG Mazak considered that the GC had
erred in law by finding that failure to act dur-
ing the administrative procedure would
preclude the undertaking from doing so before
the GC. The mere failure of Knauf Gips to contest
a particular position adopted by the Commission
in its SO cannot, contended the AG, limit its
rights of defence before the Court thus
denying it the right of access to justice.23
(2) Judgment
The ECJ held that the concept of an «undertak-
ing» in EU competition law «must be understood
as designating an economic unit even if in
law that economic unit consists of sever-
al persons, natural or legal».24 The existence of
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an economic unit, according to the ECJ, could be
inferred from a body of evidence, including in the
present case the following: (1) the shareholders of
Knauf Gips and of the other Knauf companies
were the same; (2) two managing shareholders of
Knauf Gips, Mr. B and Mr. C., were also the man-
aging shareholders of all the companies within the
Knauf Group; (3) Knauf VG was merely a holding
company without its own staff or premises; (4) the
Knauf family contract provided that its purpose
was to ensure the single management and direc-
tion of the companies in the Knauf Group; (5) the
sales figures furnished by Knauf Gips to the Com-
mission referred not only to Knauf Gips but to all
the Knauf Group’s companies which operated on
the plasterboard market; (6) without being re-
quired to do so by the Commission, Knauf Gips
sent it the turnovers of the Knauf Group, which
were subsequently used to calculate the fine.25
The ECJ stated that although the legal burden
of proof is borne by the party alleging the exis-
tence of an infringement, «the factual evidence
on which a party relies may be of such kind as to
require the other party to provide an explanation
or justification, failing which it is permissible to
conclude that the burden of proof has been dis-
charged».26 In relation to the Stora precedent, the
ECJ found that the GC did not rely on that case-
law for the conclusion that there was an econom-
ic unit. The fact that the subsidiary is not 100%
owned by the parent company could not exclude
the possible existence of an economic unit.27 On
the basis of the above the ECJ upheld the GC’s
finding that the companies belonging to Knauf
Group constitute a single economic unit.28
Having confirmed the existence of an economic
unit the ECJ examined whether the Commission
was entitled to impute the liability for the in-
fringement to Knauf Gips rather than Knauf
VG. Here, the ECJ considered the following: (1)
Knauf VG was a holding company with no staff,
managing a portfolio of companies for 22 share-
holders who were also members of the Knauf
family; (2) Knauf VG depended on Knauf Gips for
its premises and staff; (3) Knauf Gips was the only
Knauf company active on the plasterboard market
not managed by Knauf VG; (4) most of the Knauf
Group’s documents seized by the Commission
were printed on Knauf Gips’s letterhead; (5) Knauf
Gips had the largest turnover among the Knauf
companies operating on the plasterboard mar-
ket.29 These facts allowed the ECJ to conclude that
Knauf VG did not determine its market conduct
autonomously, but was dependent in this regard
on Knauf Gips.30 According to the ECJ, «the fact
that there is no single legal person at the apex of
the Knauf Group (there were three: Knauf Gips,
Knauf VG, and Knauf Fiber Glass GmbH) is no ob-
stacle to the appellant being held liable for the ac-
tions of that group».31
In relation to the GC’s understanding of the appel-
lant’s procedural rights of defence, the ECJ
agreed with AG Mazak and held that «there is no
requirement under the law of the EU that the
addressee of the Statement of Objec-
tions must challenge its various matters
of fact or law during the administrative
procedure, if it is not to be barred from doing so
later at the stage of judicial proceedings».32 A rul-
ing to the contrary would restrict the exercise of a
natural or legal person’s right to bring proceedings
before the GC under Article 263(4) TFEU. The
Court emphasised that any limitation of the rights
to an effective remedy and of access to an impar-
tial tribunal guaranteed by Article 47 of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the EU must be pro-
vided for by law.33
(3) Commentary
In its Knauf Gips judgment the ECJ contributes to
the continuous development of the concepts of
«undertaking», «single economic entity/unit» as
well as imputation of liability in EU competition
law, which remain highly contested topics. The
earlier case-law, when defining a «single econom-
ic entity/unit», attributed significant attention to
the autonomy of conduct: «if the undertak-
ings form an economic unit within which a sub-
sidiary has no real freedom to determine its course
of action on the market»,34 «the unified conduct
on the market of the parent company and its sub-
sidiaries takes precedence over the formal separa-
tion between those companies».35 As summarised
by Wish in his competition law treatise, «the cru-
cial question is whether parties to an agreement
are independent in their decision-making or
whether one has sufficient control over the affairs
of the other than the latter does not enjoy «real
autonomy» in determining its course of action on
the market».36 The older ECJ’s jurisprudence sug-
gests that in order to impute the infringement to a
parent company, the Commission would have to
establish not only that the parent company «was
able to exercise decisive influence over the policy
of the subsidiaries» but also that it «in fact used
this power».37 The later cases of Stora and Aris-
train established a rebuttable presumption
linked to the majority shareholding,
which although insufficient in itself, created prima
facie case for finding the exercise of decisive influ-




ence over a subsidiary’s conduct.38 Such presump-
tions, however, would not be applicable in the
cases of non-majority ownership or particular cor-
porate forms such as joint ventures. For exam-
ple, in the Rubber Chemicals case, the Commis-
sion stated that «in the case of a joint venture,
jointly owned by its parents, the joint venture can
be presumed to be autonomous from its parent
companies» and «to constitute a separate under-
taking».39 In another joint venture case, Sodium
Gluconate,40 the Commission established liability
of the parent companies based on the factual cir-
cumstances similar to those observed in Knauf
Gips: (1) all the joint venture executives simultane-
ously held operational responsibilities in the par-
ent companies; (2) JV’s supervisory board was
made up of two representatives of each parent
company, who were jointly responsible for the JV’s
management; (3) the JV used the premises of one
of the parent companies. Along similar lines, the
common personnel and joint supervision of the
50:50 JV in Chloroprene Rubber sufficed to estab-
lish parental liability.41
A general trend traceable through the recent line
of ECJ jurisprudence is the increased flexibility
of the criteria taken into account when es-
tablishing a single economic unit and imputing
the anti-competitive conduct to particular persons
within such a unit. In the Metsa case the ECJ firm-
ly stated that «it is settled case-law that anti-com-
petitive conduct of an undertaking can be attrib-
uted to another undertaking where it has not
decided independently upon its own conduct on
the market, but carried out, in all materials re-
spects, the instructions given to it by that other
undertaking, having regard in particular to the
economic and legal links between them».42 In its
subsequent Akzo Nobel judgment, the ECJ down-
played the importance of conduct by stating that
the conduct of subsidiary on the market was not
the only factor enabling the liability of the parent
company to be established, but was only one of
the signs of the existence of an economic unit.43 In
this regard the ECJ was criticised for implying that
the attribution of conduct between the parent
and subsidiary is always possible where both form
an economic unit.44
The peculiar situation of the Knauf Group with its
family contract, non-majority shareholdings, com-
mon management and the absence of a single en-
tity which would formally control all of the Knauf
companies, led the ECJ to further emphasise that
the specifics of the corporate structure should not
prevent the finding of decisive influence and attri-
bution of liability within a single economic unit.
The Court held in that respect that «the legal
structure particular to a group of companies,
which is characterised by the absence of a single
legal person at the apex of that group, is not deci-
sive where that structure does not reflect the ef-
fective functioning and actual organization of the
group».45 Following Akzo Nobel, the ECJ empha-
sised that the peculiarities of the corporate
structure of an economic unit are largely
irrelevant and the Commission can make infer-
ences based on a «consistent body of evidence»
calling for case-by-case assessment. In the words
of the ECJ: «account must be taken of all the rele-
vant factors relating to the economic, organisa-
tional and legal links which exist between it and
the company in the same group which is consid-
ered to be responsible for the actions of that
group, and which may vary from case to case and
cannot therefore be set out in an exhaustive list».46
This case also stands out for the decisiveness with
which the ECJ quashed the GC’s judgment in the
part related to the procedural issues in the circum-
stances where it was unlikely to change the out-
come of the appeal. The ECJ stressed that under
the TFEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
the parties are not precluded from challenging the
Commission’s findings, even if such a challenge
was not raised during the administrative proce-
dure. In the absence of an explicit legal basis, such
a restriction would be contrary to the fundamen-
tal principles of effective remedy and access
to justice. Without making any immediate con-
clusions, one might consider the transposition of
this approach onto other areas of EU competition
law, including its application in the context of a le-
niency programme.47 As noted by some commen-
tators, the Knauf Gips judgment might signal that
the Court will be more willing to consider
the arguments invoking basic rights under
the Charter and the ECHR in competition cases
than was the case in the past.48
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In this reference for a preliminary ruling to the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice (ECJ), the Local Court
Bonn (Amtsgericht Bonn, Germany) requested
guidance on whether there is a right of access by
an aggrieved party to a leniency application and
related documents voluntarily provided by a le-
niency applicant to the German competition au-
thority in order to prepare a civil-law action for
damages.
(1) Facts and Procedure
In 2008, the German Federal Cartel Office (Bun-
deskartellamt) acting pursuant to, inter alia, Art-
icle 81 EC (now Article 101 TFEU), imposed fines
